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TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION IN MISSOURI*
WILLIAM

F.

FRATCHER**

Probably the most interesting decision of the period under review was
that in Longacre v. Knowles.' The Missouri Probate Code of 1955 authorizes a person who claims title to personal property wrongfully withheld
from him by an executor or administrator as an asset of a decedent's estate
to petition the probate court for a determination of title.2 This procedure
was used by Joe Longacre to determine title to bonds and notes held by the
administratrix of Gus Longacre, deceased. The decedent lent money to
various persons, taking from them bonds or promissory notes which were
made out at his direction. Some ran to Gus Longacre or Joe Longacre, one
to Gus Longacre and Joe Longacre, some to Gus Longacre and/or Joe Longacre, one to Gus Longacre and/or Joe Longacre, or survivor, and one to Gus
Longacre and/or Joe Longacre, "as joint tenants with right of survivorship
and owners of this security." There was evidence that the decedent retained
the instruments and collected all payments made upon them during his
lifetime and that he intended that they should belong to Joe at his death.
The trial court determined that the administratrix was entitled to retain all
the notes and bonds. The Supreme Court held that the language of the
instrument last described created a joint tenancy which entitled Joe to a
right of survivorship but affirmed the judgment as to all the other instruments on the ground that their references to Joe were insufficient to create joint tenancies and, in the light of the extrinsic evidence, were testamentary and did not conform to the statutory requirements of wills.3 Because of
the peculiar wording of the statute authorizing the proceeding the court did
not decide whether Joe had some interest in the bonds and notes less than
full ownership.
*A discussion of selected Missouri court decisions reported in Volumes 323333 Southwestern Reporter, Second Series.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri; member of the Michigan and
Missouri Bars.
1. 333 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1960).
2. § 473.357, RSMo 1957 Supp., amended by Mo. Laws 1959, S.B. No. 141
§ 1. The amendments effect changes in the procedure.
3. The language of the opinion relating to the testamentary character of the
intent is in the section devoted to the note payable to Gus and/or Joe, or survivor,
but it does not appear to be restricted to this note.
(417)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
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In reaching the conclusion that the language of the notes and bonds
purporting to create an interest in Joe was testamentary and ineffective
for want of compliance with the requirements for execution of wills the
court relied heavily on the earlier case of Napier v. Eigel.4 In the Napier
case the decedent placed currency and bearer bonds in envelopes, wrote
on the envelopes that they were the property of herself and her sister,
and placed the envelopes in her safety deposit box. It was held that these
acts were insufficient to create an interest in the sister. If the decedent's
intention was donative, the transaction failed for want of delivery; if her
intention was testamentary, the writing on the envelopes failed as a will
for want of attestation. The Napier decision was sound on its facts, but
those facts did not involve an element present in Longacre v. Knowles
which, unfortunately, the court did not discuss. That element is the fact
that the notes and bonds were contracts to pay money to a third party.
Although the cases are not in harmony, there is considerable authority
for the proposition that a bond payable to the purchaser if alive at maturity,
otherwise to a named third party, is not testamentary and the third party
is entitled to the proceeds as against the purchaser's estate.' In Kansas City
Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey6 the decedent paid $50,000 to the insurance company in exchange for a contract by which it agreed to pay him a stipulated
quarterly annuity as long as he lived and, upon his death, to pay $50,000
to a named beneficiary. The decedent reserved power to change the beneficiary and did so. The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the contention

4. 350 Mo. 111, 164 S.W.2d 908 (1942). The court also relied upon an
annotation, "Instruments for payment of money naming in alternative two or
more payees," 171 A.L.R. 522 (1947). This annotation discusses a number of
cases which do support the result reached in Longacre v. Knowles. That result
is also supported by cases holding that a depositor's agreement with a bank
that his deposits shall be paid to another if he dies before withdrawing them
is testamentary. Mercantile Bank v. Haley, 179 S.W.2d 916 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944);
see Annots., 131 A.L.R. 967 (1941), 155 A.L.R. 174, 1084 (1945), 161 A.L.R. 304
(1946). As these annotations indicate, there is conflicting authority on the latter
point.
5. Annot., 168 A.L.R. 245, at 247 (1947), and cases cited in annotations
referred to in the preceding note; ATKINSON, WILLS §§ 39, 40, 44 (2d ed. 1953).
6. 353 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d 624 (1944); see Annot., 155 A.L.R. 168 (1944),
cited with approval, Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 231 S.W.2d 817, at 820 (Mo.
1950); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632, at 638 (Mo. 1954). The opinion
in the Rainey case relied upon Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127
(2d Cir. 1942); see Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1478 (1942). In this case the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy agreed with the insurance company that it should pay
her interest on the proceeds and any principal which she might demand and,
upon her death, the remaining principal should be paid to her sister.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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of the decedent's executor that the designation of beneficiary was testamentary and held that the substituted beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds of the contract as against the decedent's estate, saying:
The policy we are considering is a contract between Hall and
the insurance company for the benefit of Miss Rainey. This is true
regardless of the element of risk. It still would be a contract for the
benefit of a third person if made with a bank, a corporation of any
other sort, or an individual. In the policy Miss Rainey is a thirdparty donee-beneficiary. Restatement of Contracts, sec. 133. She is
entitled to enforce the contract even though she is a stranger to
both the contract and to the consideration. 12 Am. Jur. Contracts,
sec. 277.
The policy is not testamentary because it became effective
before Hall's death. It was a contract made and in force during
Hall's lifetime. Hence there would be no reason to surround it with
formalities which safeguard a will. .... 7
In Longacre v. Knowles the court appears to have determined, on the
basis of extrinsic evidence, that Gus Longacre arranged to have the notes
and bonds issued in the manner mentioned with the intent that he should
be entitled to payments falling due during his lifetime but that they should
be payable to Joe Longacre after his death. The expressed intention in
Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey was virtually identical. It therefore
seems impossible to reconcile these two cases. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court will clarify the law in this field at the first opportunity.

MARITAL RIGHTS

Perhaps the most extensive and important changes in the law made
by the Missouri Probate Code of 1955 were those relating to the rights of
the surviving spouse. Some of these have been discussed before.8 During
the current year several of the marital rights provisions of the Probate
Code have been interpreted judicially.
Under the English law in force when this country was settled a surviving wife was a distributee of personal property as to which her husband died intestate." The husband was free to defeat his widow's distributive
7. 353 Mo. 477, at 483.
8. 23 Mo. L. REv. 477-478 (1958); 24 Mo. L. REv. 498-501 (1959).
9. Statute of Distribution, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, §§ 5, 6. If the husband left descendants, she took a third; if he did not, she took half.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
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share in his personal property by transferring it to others either inter vivos
or by will. A wife was not an heir of her husband; her only right in his
real property was dower, a right to a life estate in a third of all lands of
which he was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage. Her inchoate dower in the land arose, as a sort of future interest, at
the moment her husband became seized; hence dower could not be defeated
by the husband by inter vivos conveyance or by will. This was not because
a conveyance by him was in fraud of marital rights but because he could
not transfer what he did not own. It would seem that, under English law,
there was no right to dower unless the husband was actually seized on or
after the date of the marriage. There is, however, American authority for
the proposition that a conveyance made on the eve of marriage for the
purpose of defeating dower may be set aside, at the suit of the disappointed
wife, as in fraud of dower. 0
In modem society, with a major part of wealth classified as personal
property, common law dower, limited to real property, is inadequate protectioni for widows. Hence there has been a tendency to enact legislation
giving widows interests in their husband's personal property, and sometimes
more than a life estate in real property, which cannot be defeated by will.
In most jurisdictions such statutes have not been construed to restrict the
husband's freedom to make inter vivos transfers; he may give all his property away if he wishes even though his purpose is to defeat his wife's "forced
'
Missouri and a very few other states, however, developed a mishare."11
nority rule to the effect that a husband's transfer of property, made during
the marriage for the purpose of defeating his wife's forced share in his
estate, would be set aside at her suit as in fraud of marital rights.1 2
The Probate Code codified and expanded the "fraud on marital rights"
by inter vivos transfer doctrine. It provides:
474.150 1. Any gift made by a person, whether dying testate
or intestate, in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse to
share in his estate, shall, at the election of the surviving spouse, be
treated as a testamentary disposition and may be recovered from
the -donee and persons taking from him without adequate considera10. Swaine v. Perini, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 482 (N.Y. 1821); Littleton v. Littleton, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 327 (1835); ATKINSON, WILLS § 32 (2d ed. 1953);
MAcDoNALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDow's SHARE (1960).
11. ATKINSON, WILLS § 32 (2d ed. 1953).
12. Newton v. Newton, 162 Mo. 173, 61 S.W. 881 (1901); Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947); ATKINSON, WILLS § 32 (2d ed. 1953).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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tion and applied to the payment of the spouse's share, as in case
of his election to take against the will.
2. Any conveyance of real estate made by a married person
at any time without the joinder or other written express assent of
his spouse, made at any time, duly acknowledged, is deemed to be
in fraud of the marital rights of his spouse, if the spouse becomes
a surviving spouse, unless the contrary is shown. 3
Loe v. Downing4 was a suit to set aside a deed as a fraud on marital
rights. Decedent purchased a farm in 1917. In 1933 he and his first wife
executed and delivered the deed in question, conveying the farm to decedent's nephew and the nephew's wife. There was no consideration for
this conveyance and it was probably given to hinder creditors of the decedent.
Decedent retained possession of the farm until 1955. Decedent's first wife
died later in 1933 and he married the plaintiff a year later. The deed was
recorded in 1939 and the plaintiff learned of it then or in 1955. Decedent
died in 1957. A judgment setting aside the deed was reversed. The Supreme
Court held that a conveyance made prior to marriage is not in fraud of the
marital rights of the surviving spouse unless made just prior to marriage
with the intention of defeating such rights. An intent to defraud creditors
is not an intent to defeat marital rights and, as his then wife joined in
the deed, decedent could not possibly have intended to defeat the marital
rights of some future unanticipated spouse. Although the plaintiff may have
been deceived or defrauded and have married the decedent in reliance
upon his ownership of the farm which he occupied, this did not make her
a bona fide purchaser within the meaning of the recording acts.
Reiniteimer v. Rledans- was also a suit to set aside a deed. In 1942
a married man conveyed a vacant lot, which he had acquired from his
father, to his sister, in exchange for a conveyance of another lot which the
sister had acquired from the father's estate. In 1948 the grantor's wife
recorded an affidavit claiming inchoate dower in the vacant lot. At her suit,
commenced in 1956, the trial court set aside her husband's deed as in
fraud of her marital rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) that
the Probate Code effectively abolished dower which was inchoate on De13. Subsection 1, which is limited to gifts, was taken from Section 33 of the
Model Probate Code (Simes, 1946). Subsection 2, which is not limited to gifts, is
peculiar to Missouri. The words, "joinder or other written express assent of his
spouse, made at any time" were substituted for "express assent of his spouse" by
Mo. Laws 1957, at 829, § 1.
14. 325 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1959).
15. 327 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1959).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
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cember 31, 1955;16 (2) that Subsection 2 of § 474.150, quoted above, applies to conveyances of land made prior to January 1, 1956; (3) that a
spouse may sue during her husband's lifetime to protect her marital rights
but that, if she does so, the penultimate clause of the subsection probably
deprives her of any presumption that a conveyance was in fraud of marital
rights; and (4) that this conveyance, by way of fair exchange, was not in
fraud of marital rights. The court declined to decide that the existence of
consideration will always prevent a conveyance of land from being in fraud
of marital rights, noting that Subsection 2 is not restricted to donative conveyances, but considered the presence of consideration "a highly material
element."
The Probate Code 17 provides for the making to a surviving spouse, or
unmarried minor children if there is no spouse, upon application, of a homestead allowance not exceeding half the estate or $7,500. Another provision
of the Code,,- as originally enacted, provided that a surviving spouse who
elected to take against the will should take by descent, as a modified share,
if there were lineal descendants of the testator, one-third of the estate. The
latter section was amended in 195710 by the addition of a subsection which
provides:
2. The rights of the surviving spouse under this section are
not given in lieu of the homestead allowance under section 474.290,
but any homestead allowance made to the surviving spouse shall be
offset against the share taken under this section.
It was held in Owen. v. Riffle20 that a surviving spouse who elected to take
against the will was entitled to a homestead allowance under the statutory
provisions as they existed prior to the 1957 amendment. This being so, the
amendment effected no change in the law.
In Sckubel v. Bonacker"z the testator had no children and his widow
died two months after he did without having applied for a homestead allowance. The widow's administrator then applied for a homestead allowance.
The Probate Code provides that if the surviving spouse dies without re16. § 474.110, RSMo 1957 Supp. This was predicted in 24 Mo. L.
(1959). Cf. Note 32 infra.
17. § 474.290, RSMo 1957 Supp.

REV.

498

18. § 474.160, RSMo 1957 Supp.
19. Mo. Laws 1957, at 853, § 1.
20. 323 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1959). Accord: I re Bell's Estate, 328 S.W.2d 697
(Mo. 1959).
21. 331 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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ceiving the homestead allowance (whether or not it has been allowed), it
may be paid to the unmarried minor children.2 2 The Code also provides
that if a child dies, marries or comes of age before his homestead allowance
has been made he shall not receive it but that if he dies, marries or comes
of age after it has been allowed but before payment, he is still entitled
to

it.23

The Code makes no provision for the death of a surviving spouse

when there are no unmarried minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed
a decision denying the application, holding that, if there are no unmarried
minor children and the surviving spouse dies before payment of the homestead allowance, whether or not it has been allowed, the right to a homestead allowance is destroyed.
In re Walton's Estate24 involved the method of making the homestead
allowance. In addition to the exempt property 25 the estate consisted of a
bank balance of $1757.11 and real property worth $10,000. The probate
court granted the widow a $2000 family allowance,2 6 determined that she

was entitled to a homestead allowance of $4878.55, and authorized her, as
administratrix, to convey the real property to herself in fee simple "subject
to a lien for such an amount as [decedent's child and heir] may have in said
property after the payment of all debts, allowances, and homestead rights
...determined by the Probate Court... at the time of the final settlement
of this estate." The Probate Code provides: "The selection of property
shall be made by the surviving spouse ....If real estate is included in the
homestead allowance, the executor or administrator shall convey the same
or an appropriate interest therein by deed to the persorn entitled thereto." 27
The Supreme Court held that this conveyance of the whole title, subject
only to a lien for an uncertain amount, was not a conveyance of an "appropriate interest" within the meaning of the statute. The opinion does not
specify the form which the conveyance should take but indicates that the
widow should receive a definite divided or undivided part of the real property
or the whole subject to payment of a definite amount.
In Wyatt v. Bauer2 the parties did not contest the propriety of a probate court order directing the administratrix to convey to herself, as widow
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

§ 474.300, RSMo 1957 Supp.
Id.
330 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 1960).
§ 474.250, RSMo 1957 Supp.
§ 474.260, RSMo 1957 Supp.

27. § 474.290, RSMo 1957 Supp.

28. 332 S.W.2d 301 (K.C. Ct. App. 1960).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 7

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

of the deceased, an undivided half of his real estate in satisfaction of her
homestead allowance. After this conveyance had been made the children of
the decedent sued the widow for partition. It appeared that physical division of the property was not possible. The circuit court ruled, on the basis
of decisions under the former homestead laws,2-9 that a homestead may not
be partitioned by sale. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a homestead allowance in real property under the Probate Code is an ordinary
estate in fee simple subject to partition under the general laws and not
affected by the restrictions on partition which applied to homesteads under
the pre-existing statutes.
Until 1857 divorce a vinculo inatrimoniiwas possible in England only
by special act of Parliament and such acts ordinarily adjusted property
rights. Consequently, the law governing the effect of divorce on the rights
of the survivor in the property of a deceased ex-spouse is modern. In the absence of statutory provision it is held, in most jurisdictions, that divorce
unaccompanied by a property settlement does not revoke provisions in a
will for the benefit of the testator's spouse but that divorce plus a property
settlement does so. 80 In Missouri it was held that even divorce accompanied
by a property settlement did not revoke provisions in a will for the benefit
of the testator's spouse.31 Prior to the Probate Code divorce did not terminate the statutory dower of an innocent and injured wife.8 2 Under the
Probate Code provisions in a will in favor of the testator's spouse are
revoked by divorce 33 and the statutory marital rights (exempt property,
family allowance, homestead, intestate share and forced share) do not
extend to an ex-spouse. In Heil v. Rogers" a wife sued for divorce and her
husband filed a cross petition for divorce. The hearing was completed and
the judge had the case under advisement when the husband died. His death
was suggested of record. Later his executor and legatees under his will filed
motions in the divorce proceeding seeking to intervene and for entry of a
divorce decree snc pro tunc. The judge first dismissed the motions. Later
29. §§ 513.495, 513.500, RSMo 1949. These sections entitled a widow to occupy
her husband's dwelling until her death or remarriage and minor children to occupy
their deceased parent's dwelling during minority.
30. ATKINSON, WILLS 431 (2d ed. 1953).
31. Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 136 S.W.2d 278 (1940).
32. § 469.200, RSMo 1949. There is a serious constitutional question as to
whether the dower of such an ex-spouse, inchoate on December 31, 1955, was effectively abolished by § 474.110, RSMo 1957 Supp., note 16 supra.

33. § 474.420, RSMo 1957 Supp.
34. 329 S.W.2d 388 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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he entered a decree on the cross-bill, granting a divorce nunc pro tunc as of
the last day of the hearing. The court of appeals held that this decree was
void because the death of a party to a divorce proceeding deprives the court
of jurisdiction to decree divorce. 35

CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS
Day v. Blackbird38 was a suit in equity for "specific performance" of an
alleged oral contract to make a will. The plaintiff alleged that, when she and
her brother became the only unmarried members of a family of nine, they
agreed to live together in the brother's house, share living expenses, hold
their securities as joint tenants, designate each other as life insurance
beneficiaries and execute wills designating each other as sole devisees. There
was evidence that the plaintiff did hold securities jointly with her brother
and designate him as life insurance beneficiary. Some of the other brothers
and sisters testified to the existence of the alleged agreement and some
testified to the contrary. The brother did make a holographic will giving
his estate to the plaintiff but this, being unwitnessed, was not admissible to
probate under Missouri law. The Supreme Court refused to disturb a finding
of the trial court that, although proof of intention to make a will was clear,
the existence of a contract to do so was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Reigkley v. Fabricius'sEstate37 was decided eight days after the final
action of the Supreme Court in the case just discussed. It was a claim against
a decedent's estate for breach of an alleged oral contract to compensate the
claimant, by provision in the decedent's will, for nursing and domestic
services rendered to the decedent and her mother-in-law in 1924, 1925 and
1931-1933. It was held that an action at law is maintainable for breach of a
contract to bequeath a definite sum (as distinguished from all or a fraction
of the estate), or the reasonable value of services, and that in such an action
at law the proof of the contract need only be by a preponderance of the
evidence. By treating the claim as an action at law the court was able to
distinguish it from cases, like that just discussed, indicating that, in equity,
proof of a contract to make a will must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
35. Relying upon Young v. Young, 165 Mo. 624, 65 S.W. 1016 (1901). This
is the usual view. See Annot., 104 A.L.R. 654 (1936).
36. 331 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1960).
37. 332 S.W.2d 76 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
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MAKING AND VALIDITY OF WILLS

The opinion in McGrail v. Rhoades" contains an interesting discussion
of the extent to which an insane delusion negatives testamentary capacity.
This was an action to contest a will giving $500 to testator's only child and
the residue, some $30,000, to his sisters, on the ground that he suffered from
an insane delusion that contestant was not his child. Contestant was born
in 1916, less than nine months after testator's marriage. Her mother
divorced the testator when contestant was nine years old and contestant
saw testator thereafter only in connection with efforts to compel or persuade him to support her. Testator and his sisters inherited oil interests
from another sister in 1946. The will was executed in 1953 and testator died
in 1955. Contestant's mother testified that once, during the marriage,
testator said that contestant was not his child, that she did not look like him;
and that in 1952 or 1953, while -drunk and being pressed to support contestant, he said that he did not have or did not remember a daughter. Two
relatives of contestant and contestant herself testified that, on occasions
when they urged him to support contestant, testator denied that contestant
was his daughter. Testator's drinking companion testified that testator said
he had a daughter who looked like him but that his sister had told him that
she was not his daughter. The will described contestant as testator's
daughter. A judgment for contestant based on a 6-3 verdict was reversed
on the ground that the evidence of insane delusion was insufficient for submission to a jury. The court stressed the langauge of the will and the absence
of expert testimony.
When a deed of conveyance of land is delivered to a third party, with
irrevocable instructions to redeliver to the grantee upon the death of the
grantor, it is arguable that the transaction is testamentary and effective only
if the instrument conforms to the requirements for wills. The courts have
not tended, however, to treat such a transaction as testamentary. In some
jurisdictions such a transaction is treated as a delivery in escrow, which
does not pass title until the second delivery, but the second delivery relates
back, for the purpose of determining the validity and effect of the conveyance, to the date of the first delivery. In other jurisdictions such a transaction is deemed to pass title to the grantee at the time of the first delivery,
subject to a life estate in the grantor 9 Previous Missouri decisions adopt38. 323 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1959), noted, 35 N. Y. U. L. REv. 478 (1960).
39. ATKINSON, WILLS § 43 (2d ed. 1953).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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ing the latter view 0 were followed in Bailey v. Williams,#1 holding that the
grantee in such a deed could maintain ejectment, after the death of the
grantor, without alleging that the second delivery had been made.
Peters v. Dodd 2 was a proceeding to probate a lost will in which the
court applied the usual presumption that, when a will last seen in the
possession of the testator cannot be found after his .death, it was destroyed
by him with intent to revoke. Evidence that the testator made gifts to his
daughters, who were disinherited by the will, shortly before his death and
that one of them, to the testator's knowledge, had sustained serious injuries,
was held to be admissible in support of the presumption.
Wilburn v. Meyer43 was a tort action for damages for alleged fraudulent
suppression of a will. There is no authority in Missouri for the existence of
such a cause of action but the defendant conceded that such suppression is
a tort. The decedent died in 1942 and an instrument dated January 5, 1937,
which specifically devised to the plaintiff land which the decedent had sold
before his death, was admitted to probate as his will. The plaintiff testified
that the defendant, in 1949, handed her a typewritten paper purporting to
be a copy of a will of the decedent, also dated January 5, 1937, which specifically devised to the plaintiff land which the decedent owned at the time of
his death. The defendant admitted the truth of this testimony but denied
knowledge of the source of the typewritten paper, having received it from
the decedent's widow, since deceased. The trial court, sitting without a jury,
entered judgment for the defendant and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that plaintiff had the burden of proving the execution of a valid will and
its suppression by the defendant. There being no substantial proof of execution, the burden was not met.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

In Ussker v. Mercantile Trust Co."4 the testator's wife, who was his sole
heir and distributee on intestacy, lived apart from him. By his will be bequeathed to her his clothing, jewelry, furniture and other chattels of a
40. Crites v. Crites, 225 S.W. 990 (Mo. 1920); Tillman v. City of Carthage,
297 Mo. 74, 247 S.W. 992 (1923); cases cited in the opinion cited in the following
note.

41.
42.
43.
44.

326
328
329
328

S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d
S.W.2d

115
603
228
699

(Mo. 1959).
(Mo. 1959).
(K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
(Mo. 1959).
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personal nature. The will then bequeathed to trustees an amount equal
to the maximum marital deduction under the Internal Revenue Code, to pay
the income to his wife for life and to distribute the principal as she should
by will appoint. After stating that the provisions therein made for his wife
were in lieu of all statutory and other legal rights in his estate, the will
bequeathed the residue, if his wife survived him, to trustees to pay the income to his wife for life. A final clause provided that, if testator's wife predeceased him, the funds which would otherwise form the two trusts should
pass to two cousins or their heirs, "and the same disposition shall be made of
any of my property remaining which has not been disposed of under my
will." A judgment determining that the remainder in the property included
in the second trust was undisposed of by the will and passed to testator's
wife as intestate distributee was reversed, the Supreme Court holding that,
in the light of the circumstances, the final clause was intended to pass the
remainder in the residue to the cousins even though the testator was survived by his wife. The usual presumption against partial intestacy conduced,
of course, to this result.
Mavrakos v. Papadimtrio4 5 involved the construction of a will clause
reading, "Remaining half of my estate to be equally divided among my
nieces and nephews as follows: Children of my deceased sister, Kanela
Panagiotokopoulou. Haralampon S. Papademetriou, Athens, Greece." It appeared that the testator's deceased sister, Kanela, had five children and that
he had nephews named Haralampon T. Papadimitriou, of Athens, Greece,
son of his deceased brother, Theodore, and Haralampon S. Papadimitriou
of Valtesinico, Greece, son of his living brother, Soterion. A prior clause of
the will gave a quarter of the estate to Soterion and there was evidence that
the testator corresponded regularly with Haralampon T. Papadimitriou of
Athens. The trial court decided that Haralampon T. Papadimitriou of
Athens was the nephew intended to be named and that he took a quarter of
the estate, the other quarter passing to the descendants of Kanela. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the words equally divided among
called for equal division among persons rather than between classes and that,
the intention being ascertainable from the will, resort to extrinsic evidence
of the testator's attitude toward his relatives was not necessary to decide the
per capita-per stirpes question. In consequence, Haralampon T. Papadimitriou took only a twelfth of the estate.
45. 331 S.W.2d 161 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7

12

19601

Fratcher: Fratcher: Trusts and Succession in Missouri

TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION IN MISSOURI

The will involved in Schubel v. Bonacker" contained a bequest of
"$10,000.00 in bank stock of the Industrial Bank of St. Louis, Mo., and its
accumulations." On the date of the will the testator owned 500 shares of
stock in the Industrial Bancshares Corporation worth $9500.00. The Industrial Bancshares Corporation then owned virtually all the stock of the
Industrial Bank of St. Louis and this stock constituted some forty per
cent of its assets. After the execution of the will the Industrial Bancshares
Corporation changed its name to General Contract Corporation and, incident to a stock split, issued 500 shares of stock under the latter name to
the testator. At about the same time the Industrial Bank of St. Louis dropped
the word "Industrial" from its name. A determination that the bequest carried the stock in the General Contract Corporation owned by the testator at
the time of his death was affirmed in an opinion following the usual rule that
parol evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity. The will contained
another bequest of "$1512.00 in the First National Bank of St. Louis, Mo."
to testator's wife. At the time of his death the testator had no account in the
First National Bank of St. Louis but did own thirty-six shares of its
capital stock. A determination that the bequest did not carry the stock
but did entitle the wife to $1512 was affirmed without discussion of the
question whether the bequest was specific or demonstrative. If the bequest
was specific, the wife should have received the stock or nothing, depending
upon whether the language was deemed to relate to stock or a deposit.
The result reached amounts to a decision that the bequest was demonstrative. That seems questionable. 7
Gehring v. Henry' s involved an ineptly drafted instrument signed by a
husband and wife and purporting to be their joint will. The first clause
devised all property of the husband "unconditionally" to the wife. The
second clause devised all property of the wife to the husband. The third
clause provided, "in case we the undersiners [sic] died on or near the same

46. 331 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1960).
47. A specific bequest is of definite property; it is defeated by ademption if
the testator does not own that property at the time of his death. A demonstrative
legacy is one which is to be paid out of a designated fund, but payable ,at all
events even if this fund fails. It, like a specific bequest, has priority, to the extent
of the designated fund, over general legacies but, unlike a specific bequest, it is not
defeated by ademption if the testator disposes of the designated fund before his
death. The late Professor Atkinson pointed out that the courts are inclined to
construe legacies as demonstrative although the language of the will suggests either
a specific or a general legacy. ATKINSON, WILLS 735 (2d ed. 1953).
48. 332 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1960).
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date all of the real and persnal [sic] property owened [sic] and by each
and/or by both of us is to be divided equelly [sic] between" named nephews
of the husband. Only the husband had property at the date of execution of
the instrument and neither spouse had descendants. In 1952 or 1953 the
husband wrote on the instrument, "The Sisters [of the wife] will have no
claim on estate at any time" and he made oral statements that he did not
want his wife's sisters "to have a thing." The husband died in 1953 and the
instrument was admitted to probate as his will. The wife was declared insane in 1953. She died in 1958 and the instrument was admitted to probate
as her will. A judgment determining that, on the death of the wife, the
property passed to her sisters as intestate distributees was affirmed. It was
held that the written and oral declarations of the husband could not be
used to achieve a distribution not provided for in the will.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES

Alexander's Estate v. McElhiney40 was decided on a purely procedural

ground. Heirs who objected to an administrator's final settlement filed motions to modify the settlement, remove the administrator and compel him
to account. The matter was removed to the circuit court, which granted a
default judgment against the administrator sustaining the objections to his
settlement, revoking his letters, and requiring him to appear in court the
next day to render an account. The administrator appealed from this judgment. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the judgment was
interlocutory and not appealable.
In re Toler's Estate0 involved a widow's petition for letters of administration on the estate of her husband, who died in 1956, leaving personal
property in Missouri. The decedent was born and educated in Missouri
and practiced law here until 1937. He paid his Missouri Bar dues as long
as he lived. After 1937 he spent weekends, and kept some of his effects, in
a hotel in Louisiana, using it as a headquarters from which he traveled in
connection with his business of securing oil and gas leases. He registered
as a voter, licensed his automobile and paid resident income tax in Louisiana. He resisted attempts to collect Missouri income tax on the ground
that he was located permanently in Louisiana and did not intend to reside
again in Missouri. Decedent's mother and sisters obtained a judgment from
49. 327 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. 1959).
50. 325 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. 1959).
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a Louisiana district court determining that he was domiciled there and
that they were entitled to his entire estate, a widow not being an heir or
distributee under Louisiana law. Under Missouri law the widow of an
intestate survived by a mother and sisters is entitled to exempt property,51
a family allowance 52 and half the net estate.53 A judgment dismissing the
petition was affirmed on the ground that, as a matter of fact, the decedent
was domiciled in Louisiana. Having decided the case on this ground, the
court found it unnecessary to inquire into the effects of the Louisiana
judgment. It did not decide whether, if ancillary administration proceedings
were commenced in Missouri, the widow would be entitled to a family
allowance. 54
Nortk v. Hawkinson55 was a suit commenced against an executrix in
the circuit court twelve months after the first publication of notice of letters testamentary. The pleadings alleged that the plaintiff and the decedent
had been partners in a business of real estate investment, that the partnership had been dissolved and that, by mutual agreement, the decedent was
engaged in winding up its affairs at the time of his death. The plaintiff
sought an accounting and a money judgment for his share of the profits.
The Probate Code provides that all claims against decedents' estates,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, which are
not filed in the probate court within nine months after the first published
notice of letters testamentary or of administration, are forever barred. 56
It also provided that actions against a decedent's estate, commenced after
death, shall be barred unless notice of the institution thereof is filed in the
probate court within nine months after the first published notice of
letters. 7 Prior to the Probate Code it was held that the nonclaim statute
then in force did not apply to claims which could not be adjudicated in the
probate court and that the probate court could not adjudicate upon purely

51. § 474.250, RSMo 1957 Supp.
52. § 474.260, RSMo 1957 Supp.
53. § 474.010, RSMo 1957 Supp.
54. § 473.675(3), RSMo 1957 Supp., enacted by Mo. Laws 1957, at 862, § 3,
provides that, in the administration of a non-resident's estate the family allowance
of the surviving spouse shall be governed by the law of the decedent's domicile or
that of Missouri, whichever is more liberal to the spouse. This was enacted after
the death of the decedent Toler.
55. 324 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1959).
56. § 473.360(1), RSMo 1957 Supp. There are some exceptions.
57. §§ 473.360(2), 473.367, RSMo 1957 Supp. The 1959 amendment to
§ 473.360(2) is discussed in note 60infra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
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equitable claims5 s A judgment of the circuit court dismissing the suit on
the ground that it was barred by the nonclaim provisions of the Probate
Code was affirmed. The Supreme Court held that, under the Code, claims

are barred whether or not the probate court has power to adjudicate on
them and that, therefore, it was unnecessary to decide whether the claim
could have been allowed by the probate court.
Clarke v. Orga.n' was a suit by a guardian of minors for the wrongful
death of their parents against the administratrix of the alleged tort-feasor's
estate. The parents and the alleged tort-feasor were killed in a collision on
September 1, 1956. Notice of the issuance of letters of administration to
the defendant was published October 11, 1956. The wrongful death action
was commenced on November 10, 1956. The defendant was served on November 23, 1956, and filed an answer alleging a defense of contributory
negligence. On October 16, 1957, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the action was barred by failure to file notice of its institution in the probate court within nine months after the first publication of
notice of letters. Notice was filed in the probate court later. It appeared
that the assets of the estate amounted to only $125 and that the plaintiff
wished a judgment so as to be able to proceed against the liability insurer
of the decedent tort-feasor. A judgment granting the motion to dismiss
was affirmed. The court held that the administratrix could not waive or
be estopped to assert the bar arising from failure to file on time in the
probate court. The 1959 amendments to the Probate Code probably require a different result on facts like those involved in this case. 0
As is usual, there were a number of cases involving claims against
decedents' estates. Some of these turned on questions of proof. 6' One in-

58. Orr v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 291 Mo. 383, 236 S.W. 642 (1922).
59. 329 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
60. As originally enacted, § 473.360, RSMo 1957 Supp. provided, "2. All
actions against the estate of a deceased person, pending or filed under sections
473.363 or 473.367, shall abate or shall be barred unless notice of the revival or institution thereof is filed in the probate court within nine months after the first
published notice of letters." This subsection now provides, "Unless written notice
of actions instituted or revived under sections 473.363 or 473.367 is filed in the
probate court within nine months after the first published notice of letters, no recovery may be had in any such action on any judgment therein against the executor
or administrator out of any assets being administered upon in the probate court or
from any distributee or other person receiving such assets." Mo. Laws 1959, S.B. No.
305 § 1.
61. Wardin v. Quinn, 324 S.W.2d 151 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959); Schrock v.
Lawrence's Estate, 327 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. 1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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v01ved a question of considerable interest in the law of insurance.62 The
decedent was engaged in the business of purchasing livestock and selling
it through a stockyard operated by the claimant. The claimant earned
substantial commissions for handling and selling decedent's livestock and
lent the decedent some $11,000 to finance his business. Claimant, with the
consent of the decedent, insured the decedent's life for $21,000, paid the
premiums himself, and collected the insurance proceeds. When claimant
filed a claim for the $11,000 which he lent to the decedent, the administrator contended that, as claimant's only insurable interest was as a creditor,
his designation as beneficiary of the insurance policy was for security only.
This being so, it was contended that the claim had been fully paid by the
insurance proceeds and that claimant was bound to pay to the estate the
amount by which the proceeds exceeded the claim. The Supreme Court
refused to disturb a determination by the trial court that claimant had
an insurable interest in the decedent's life arising from their business association and that the policy was to protect his anticipated profits from this
association rather than his rights as a creditor. This being so, claimant was
entitled to both the insurance proceeds and repayment of the amount lent
to the decedent.
Barnes v. Hiltonos was concerned with a question of priority between
a federal tax lien and a judgment against the decedent. Barnes recovered a
judgment against Hilton in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas.
Hilton subsequently died. Without reviving the judgment against Hilton's
executrix, Barnes, on June 14, 1957, filed a petition on foreign judgment in
the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, and had a writ of garnishment served on a bank there in which Hilton had an account. On September
6 and 9, 1957, the United States filed tax liens against Hilton's estate in
Johnson County, Kansas, and Jackson County, Missouri. On October 11,
1957, Barnes secured a revivor of the judgment against Hilton's executrix
in Johnson County, Kansas, and filed a copy in the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri. The United States petitioned to intervene in
the Missouri proceeding, claiming that its lien had priority over the garnishment. The circuit court dismissed the petition for intervention and the court
of appeals reversed, holding that a duly filed federal tax lien has priority
over a writ of garnishment issued prior to judgment, that the original

62. Poland v. Fisher's Estate, 329 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1959).
63. 323 S.W.2d 831 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
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judgment in this case, under both Kansas and Missouri law, became
dormant upon the death of the judgment debtor and that, consequently,
Barnes's priority dated from the time of the revivor, which was subsequent
to the filing of the federal tax lien.
Robinson v. Gaines8 ' was an action by a widow against the administrator of her husband's estate for damages for personal injuries incurred by
the plaintiff in an automobile collision in New Mexico in which the husband,
who was driving, was killed. Both spouses were domiciled in Missouri, where
such actions are permitted. 65 A judgment sustaining a motion to dismiss was
affirmed. The court held that the question of whether an injury inflicted
by one spouse on another is a tort is a question of substantive law governed
by the law of the place where the act was done. In the absence of a New
Mexico decision on the point it must be assumed that New Mexico follows
the common law, under which such an injury is not a tort.
Steva v. Steva 6 was a claim for the value of washing, ironing, mending
and meals furnished to the decedent between 1918 and 1957. It was held
that the fact that the claimant was a sister-in-law of the decedent did not
give rise to a presumption that the services were performed gratuitously but
that, there having been a break in the continuity of the service from 1930
to 1934, the statute of limitations barred recovery for services rendered
67
prior thereto.
CREATION AND TERMINATION OF

TRUSTS

8 is a clear, well-reasoned
The opinion in In re Sidebotto's EstateI

and helpful discussion of the question of when the donee of a power of
appointment holds the power on trust. The testator devised his residuary
estate to an individual trustee, to hold for not less than six or more than
ten years. After six years the trustee was directed to transfer the trust
property
to that Presbyterian School located in the west half of the Synod
of Missouri, which the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America ... shall designate.
... Should said Board at the end of said period not designate any
64. 331 S.WN2d 653 (Mo. 1960).
65. Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
66. 332 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1960).
67. On the latter point the decision follows that in Minor v. Lillard, 289
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1956), noted, 22 Mo. L. REv. 402 (1957).
68. 327 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. 1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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such school to receive said property, then the said trust shall continue for a period of not to exceed four years, under the provisions
in this will; and if the said Board shall not within said additional
period of four years designate any such a school to receive said
property, the .said Trustee shall pay and turn over to Park College,
Parkville, Missouri, all of said property, money and funds in his
hands.
At the end of ten years the Board of Christian Education adopted a
resolution expressly declining to designate a school. Missouri Valley College, alleging that it was the only Presbyterian school located in the west
half of the Synod of Missouri, sued the trustee and Park College for a
determination that, by virtue of the terms of the will and a prior oral
agreement with the testator, the Board of Christian Education held the
power of appointment on trust and was under an imperative duty to
exercise it. The trial court sustained the defendants' motions for judgment
on the pleadings and dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that,
in view of the express gift over in default of appointment, the will manifested an intention that the donee should have discretion as to whether to
exercise the power. This being so, extrinsic evidence of an oral agreement
that the power was on trust and imperative would be inadmissible because
it would contradict the clear language of the will.
Hughes v. Neely and the companion case, Hugles v. Smith,"9 which
relate to judicial power to direct premature termination of trusts, have
implications which are disturbing as to security of land titles. A settlor
created two trusts of land, one by will and one by inter vivos conveyance.
The same individual was trustee of both trusts and, by the terms of both,
he was to pay the income to the settlor's daughter, Margaret, during her
lifetime. The will limited a remainder, on the death of Margaret, to her
heirs, and empowered the trustee and Margaret to mortgage or sell her
interest. The deed limited a remainder, on the death of Margaret, to the
heirs of her body or, in default of such heirs, to the heirs of the settlor, and
empowered the trustee, with the consent of Margaret, to mortgage "such
part of the real estate herein conveyed and to such an amount as he may
deem necessary for the proper care and support of the said Margaret." The
settlor died in 1921. In 1930 Margaret and a successor trustee brought two
suits against Margaret's only child, William, and the other children of the

69. 332 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1960).
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settlor, alleging that the income from the land was insufficient to pay taxes
and mortgages encumbering it, that this made the carrying out of the
purpose of the trust, providing income for Margaret, impossible. The decree
in one case declared the trusts cancelled and that title to the lands was in
Margaret as heir of the settlor. The decree in the other case quieted title
in Margaret as heir of the settlor. Margaret and the successor trustee, who
was her husband, later conveyed the, lands to the defendants.
The present litigation comprised suits brought by Margaret's children,
William. and Mary, the latter of whom was born in 1931, against Margaret
and her grantees for a declaration that the 1930 decrees were ineffective
as against their contingent remainders in the land. Judgments granting
the relief prayed were affirmed. The Supreme Court held that contingent
remainders are indestructible in Missouri70 and that the 1930 decrees were
void on their faces because a court of equity has no power, on the facts
stated in the 1930 petitions, to destroy contingent remainders by a decree
terminating trusts. That the 1930 decrees were erroneous in failing to protect the contingent remaindermen seems evident 7 but that they were subject to collateral attack by a party to the cases in which they were entered,
72
thirty years after entry, is not so evident.

TRUST ADMINISTRATION
First National Bank v. Smirnoff7' was a suit by testamentary trustees
for construction of the will and instructions as to their duties. One clause
of the will directed the trustees to pay the testator's wife, out of principal
or income, $500 a month, plus hospital, medical, nursing and funeral bills.
A second clause directed the trustees to pay the testator's daughter, out
70. Citing Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 268 (1941), and Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66
(1940), which held that contingent remainders cannot be destroyed by merger. See
Moore v. Moore, 329 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. 1959), discussed at the end of this article.
As the contingent remainders involved in Hughes v. Neely and Hughes v. Smith
were protected by trusts they would not have been destructible even under
seventeenth century English law. Pye v. Gorge, 1 P. Wins. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323
(1710), aff'd. sub. nom. Gorges v. Pye, 7 Brown 221, 3 Eng. Rep. 144 (1712);
Fratcher, Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only Ascertainable Beneficiary, 47 MicH. L.
REv. 907, 910-915 (1949).
71. Hughes v. Federal Trust Co., 119 NJ. Eq. 502, 183 At. 299 (Eq. 1936);
RESTATEMENT (SEcond), TRUSTS § 168, Comment d (1959). Cf. § 167, Ill. 6; § 168,
111. 5; § 335, Comment a; § 336, Comment b.
72. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 345, Comment i (1959).
73. 325 S.W.2d 359 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7

20

1960]

Trusts and Succession
in Missouri
IN MISSOURI
TRUSTS Fratcher:
AND Fratcher:
SUCCESSION

of principal or income, $250 a month, plus hospital, medical, nursing and
funeral bills. A third clause directed the trustees, at the death. of the
testator's wife, to pay his daughter $750 a month. It did not mention principal, income or hospital, medical and. nursing bills. The widow elected to
take against the will and an earlier construction proceeding determined
that this was equivalent to her death for purposes of the third clause.
The income was not quite sufficient to enable the trustees to pay $750 a
month from income. A decree determining that the daughter was entitled to
$750 a month, payable from principal to the extent necessary, but not to any
additional amount for hospital, medical or nursing bills, was affirmed.

RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

In Williams v. Ellis74 an uncle purchased land on foreclosure of a second deed of trust, paying $3500, and had the deed made out to his nephew
and the nephew's wife. The nephew and his wife assumed and agreed to
pay a $6,729.68 balance due on a first deed of trust. The income from the
property was reported in the nephew's tax returns, not in the uncle's. The
uncle paid the property taxes and repair bills and collected the rents during
his lifetime. The nephew signed all leases as owner and the uncle signed
letters as agent for the nephew. The uncle told others that he had given
the property to his nephew. After the uncle's death, thirty-five of his heirs
sued to establish a resulting trust in the property. A judgment for the
nephew and his wife was affirmed on the ground that the evidence was
sufficient to warrant a finding that the uncle did not intend a resulting
75
trust for himself.

Harrellsonv. Barks"6 was an action by the administratrix of a husband
for damage to an automobile incurred in a collision while his wife was driving. Title to the automobile was in the name of the husband alone but
the defendant contended that, because he purchased it with funds drawn
from a bank account opened in the joint names of husband and wife, the
wife was a co-owner of the vehicle. This contention was rejected on the
ground that, when a spouse acquiesces in the other spouse's withdrawing
funds from a joint account to purchase property in his own name, the
74. 323 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1959). For earlier discussions of the purchase money
resulting trust doctrine in Missouri see 22 Mo. L. REv. 407-410 (1957); 24 Mo. L.
REv. 511 (1959).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 441 (1959).
76. 326 S.W.2d 351 (Spr. Ct. App. 1959).
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acquiescing spouse has no interest in the property so acquired, by way of
resulting trust or otherwise.
It is well established that, when a husband pays the consideration for
a transfer of property to his wife, a resulting trust does not arise in the
absence of a manifestation of intention on the part of the husband that
the wife should not be the beneficial owner.77 In other words, when a husband pays for a transfer to his wife there is a rebuttable presumption that a
gift was intended. When, however, a wife pays the consideration for a
transfer of property to her husband, there is a rebuttable presumption that
a resulting trust, not a gift, was intended.7 As to property purchased with
funds withdrawn from joint bank accounts the decision in Harrelson v.
Barks would seem to apply a presumption of gift, rather than resulting
trust, whether title is taken in the name of the wife or the husband.
Staekle v. Mercantile Trust Company"9 was a curious case which, perhaps, should have been discussed under the heading "Marital Rights." The
plaintiff resided with a woman for forty-four years, ostensibly as her husband, and permitted her to handle his financial affairs. After her death he
discovered that she had transferred some $30,000, which must have been
derived from his earnings, to a trust company upon trust for herself and her
relatives. The plaintiff then sued to establish title to the trust property. A
judgment denying relief was affirmed on the theory that the woman had
appropriated no more than her services were reasonably worth.
In Moore v. Moore"o land was devised to Moore and the heirs of his
body. Under the Statute of Westminster II, Chapter I, commonly known
81
as De Donis Conditionalibus,
this devise would have vested an estate
tail in Moore. Under the Missouri statute abolishing entails the devise
operated to give Moore a life estate with contingent remainder to the heirs
of his body. 2 Prior to his marriage the life tenant entered into an agree77. Hampton v. Niehaus, 329 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1959); Fisher v. Miceli, 291
S.W.2d 845 (Mo. 1956), noted, 22 Mo. L. REv. 409 (1957); Glynn v. Glynn, 291
S.W.2d 190 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 442 (1959).
78. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRuSTS § 442, Comment a (1959). See Glauert
v. Huning, 290 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. 1956).
79. 327 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. 1959).
80. 329 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. 1959). Hughes v. Neely and Hughes v. Smith,
swpra note 69, involved attempts to destroy contingent remainders by a different
method.
81. 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285).
82. § 442.470, RSMo 1949. "In cases where, by the common or statute law of
England, any person might become seized in fee tail of any lands, by virtue of any
devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, or by any other means whatever, such perhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss4/7
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ment with his uncle for the purpose of "barring the entail," i.e., destroying
the contingent remainder. Pursuant to this agreement the life tenant refrained from paying taxes, the land was sold at tax sale to a straw party
and the uncle paid the price bid at the tax sale. The uncle also paid the
life tenant's debts to others and discharged debts due to himself. The straw
party conveyed, through another straw party, to the uncle, as trustee for
the uncle's wife. In the latter capacity the uncle contracted to convey in
fee simple to the former life tenant upon being reimbursed for the amounts
paid and discharged by him. The former life tenant did not take advantage
of this contract. More than thirty years after these transactions the children
of the former life tenant sued him and those claiming title through or under
the uncle for a determination that they were entitled to a contingent remainder in the land expectant upon the former life tenant's death. A judgment for the plaintiffs was affirmed, the court holding that, having colluded
with the life tenant to defeat the contingent remainder, the uncle held
upon constructive trust for the contingent remaindermen. As those who
acquired the title through or under the uncle either had notice of the trust
or were mere donees, they, too, held upon constructive trust.
The statute abolishing entails had long been interpreted as converting
the interest of the heirs of the body of a donee in tail from a mere expectancy of inheritance into a remainder8 3 Under modern Missouri law a
contingent remainder is not destructible by merger.84 It is well settled that
the life tenant has a fiduciary duty to protect an indestructible remainder
and that he may not enlarge his estate, at the expense of the remainder,
by purchasing at a tax sale. 5 From these premises the result reached in
Moore v. Moore seems to follow logically. Yet a glance at the history of
entails may raise doubts as to its soundness.
son, instead of being seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be,
and shall become, seized thereof for his natural life only; and the remainder shall
pass inofee simple absolute to the person to whom the estate tail would, on the death
of the first grantee, devisee or donee in tail, first pass according to the course of
the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance." For the history and interpretation of this legislation see Hudson, Estates Tail in Missouri, 7
ILL. L. REv. 355 (1913), reprinted, 1 U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5 (1913); Steiner,
Estates Tail in Missouri, 7 U. KAN. Crr- L. REV. 93 (1939).
83. Note 82 supra.
84. Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66 (1940); note 70 supra.
85. Annot., 126 A.L.R. 862, at 871 (1940). See Witcher v. Hanley, 299 Mo.
696, 253 S.W. 1002 (1923); Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 550, 134 S.W.2d 62;
Annots., 126 A.L.R. 853 (1939), 137 A.L.R. 1054 (1942); 137 Am. St. Rep. 651
(1910), 139 Am. St. Rep. 82, at 118 (1910).
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De Donis- Conditionalibusserved two purposes which were important
to, the English nobility of the thirteenth century. First, it permitted the
creation of a perpetuity, by allowing land to be settled in such a manner that
it would remain in the family as long as the family existed. A tenant in tail
could convey only a life estate; neither a conveyance by him nor a forfeiture of his lands for treason would defeat the right of the heirs of his
body- to the land. Thus remote generations were protected against the
improvidence and political mistakes of their forbears. Second, it permitted
the establishment of a special course of descent differing from that prescribed by the common law. To understand the importance of this it must
be recalled that wills of land were not permitted until 1540,87 that contingent
remainders could not be limited to unborn or unascertained persons until
the fifteenth century," and that no way to create an indestructible contingent remainder was found until the seventeenth century.80 Moreover,
even after the creation of indestructible contingent remainders became
possible, the Rule in Shelley's Case90 prevented the limitation of a remainder
to the heirs or heirs of the body of a life tenant. Suppose Lord Stone's
daughter was about to become the second wife of Lord Rock, who had
children by his first wife, and Stone wished to convey land to Rock by
way of dowry. Stone wished, of course, to have the land pass to his daughter's descendants on the death of Rock. If he conveyed the land to Rock
in fee simple, the land would descend on the death of Rock to Rock's
eldest son by his first wife and Rock could not change the course of descent
by will. It was not possible to convey a life estate to Rock with contingent
remainder to his heirs by his second wife. It was possible to convey an
estate tail to Rock and the heirs of his body by his second wife. If Lord
Stone's daughter had children, they would inherit the estate tail under this
limitation; if she did not, or her issue became extinct, the land would revert
to Lord Stone's family.
The first purpose of De Donis, the creation of indestructible perpetuities,
ceased in 1472 when the courts decided that a tenant in tail in possession

86. Note 81 supra. For the development prior to De Donis and the effect of
see FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 17-27 (1954).
87. Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540).
88. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 134-136 (3rd ed. 1923).
89. Duncomb v. Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437, 83 Eng. Rep. 770 (1697); Fratcher,
Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only AscertainableBeneficiary, 47 MicI. L. REv. 907,
913 (1949).
90. 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234 (1581). If this was attempted,
the life tenant took an estate in fee.
the statute,
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could bar both the heirs in tail and the reversioner or remainderman by
suffering a common recovery, a default judgment in a collusive suit brought
by one who was feigned to have a title superior to that of the tenant in
tail.-' After this decision a tenant in tail could bar the entail and vest a
fee simple in himself or a purchaser with relative ease. The second purpose
of De Donis, the establishment of special courses of descent, continued
to exist and had importance, particularly because of the restrictive effect
of the Rule in Shelley's Case.
Spanish law permitted perpetually unbarrable entails. Entailment was
the bulwark which supported the Spanish feudal system under which a
few noble families owned all the land in Spain and the rest of the populace

was reduced to the status of poverty-stricken peasantry:9 2 Such a system
prevents improvements in agricultural methods, impedes the development
of industry and commerce and makes democracy impossible. 93 The original
Missouri legislation abolishing entails was a provision in the statute of
1816 adopting English law which declared, "The doctrine of entails shall
never be allowed."'94 The legislators of 1816 who made that ringing declaration were aware that entailment was a buttress of aristocracy and an implacable obstacle to liberty, equality and general prosperity. They also
knew that, under English law, a tenant in tail could bar the entail only
by a judicial proceeding and that a tenant for life could destroy contingent

91. Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, Mich., pl. 25 (1472). This case was
decided the year after the short-lived restoration of Henry VI to the throne. There
is a tradition that the decision was dictated by Edward IV with a view to minimizing the amount of land which was exempt from forfeiture for treason. PIGcOrr,
COMMON RECOVERIES 8-9 (1739). By the seventeenth century it was settled law
that the tenant in tail could not be prevented from barring the entail by a trust
or any other device. Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 (1613);
North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13, 23 Eng. Rep. 270 (1681). Estates tail were subjected
to forfeiture for treason by 26 Hen. 8, c. 13, § 5 (1534) and 33 Hen. 8, c. 20, § 3
(1541). Stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 12 (1623) permitted creditors of the tenant in tail
to reach them through bankruptcy proceedings.
92. HERu, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY REvOLUTION IN SPAIN 91-97, 393-394
(1958); OLIVEIRA, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND MEN OF MODERN SPAIN 59-60, 211236 (1946).
93. DALRYMPLE, GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY, c. 4 (1758); ADAM
SMrrH, WEALTH OF NATIoNS, Bk. III, c. 2 (1776); ScRuT-roN, LAND IN Fm-rrRs
(1886); W. C. Smith, Entail, 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrANNICA 450 (9th ed. 1892);
Fratcher, Legal Servitudes as Devices for Imposing Use Restrictions .in Michigan,
2 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 (1955).
94. 1 Mo. TERR. LAws 436 (January 9, 1816). The 1816 statute is ,printed ,.in

the historical note to § 1.010 VA.M.S.
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remainders without one. They hated the very name of entails."' Is it
probable that they intended by their declaration to make every entail unbarrable for a whole lifetime, a clog on alienability and development which
had not been permitted in England since 1472? Is it not more likely that,
in their eagerness to do away with entails, they sought to empower every
tenant in tail to bar the entail at once, without the expense of litigation
and without waiting for the next term of court? 6
The Missouri statute abolishing entails, as interpreted in Moore v.
Moore, makes a conveyance or devise which would have created an estate
tail under De Doinis operate to vest a life estate in the donee in tail with
an indestructible contingent remainder in the heirs of his body, who, of
course, cannot be ascertained until his death. As Missouri has abolished
the Rule in Sltelley's Case,97 it is possible to effect this result by an express
conveyance or devise for life, with remainder to the heirs or heirs of the
body of the life tenant. Hence the entail statute no longer serves a useful
purpose. Because it is relatively easy to use, by inadvertence, words which
technically limit an estate tail, the statute is a dangerous trap for grantors
and testators who really intend to create an estate in fee simple. Falling
into this trap may impose heartrending suffering on the grantee or devisee
whom the grantor or testator intended to benefit and protect. Being only a
life tenant, he cannot convey or mortgage the fee simple for his own benefit
and may well be unable to finance necessary improvements or the purchase
of implements, fertilizer and seed. 98
The statute abolishing entails is defective, moreover, in failing to specify
clearly who takes the fee simple upon the death of the donee in tail (life
95. The abolition of entails was one of the major objects of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century revolutionary movements in Europe and America. It may be recalled that Thomas Jefferson resigned from the Continental Congress in 1776 to
devote himself to revising the laws of Virginia to eradicate aristocracy. The first
item on his list of needed reforms, and the first adopted, was the abolition of
entails. 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrANNICA 302 (11th ed. 1911).
96. See Ely, Can an Estate Tail be Docked During Life of First Taker?, 45
U. Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 3 (1931). At one time Professor Eckhardt thought that the
contingent remainders created by the Missouri statute abolishing entails should be
deemed indestructible. Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in
Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 268, 279-280 (1941). He has since modified his views.
Eckhardt and Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests and Conveyances in
Missouri, 23 V.A.M.S. 1, 23 (1952).
97. § 442.490, RSMo 1949. This section was first enacted in 1845.

98. § 528.010, RSMo 1949 permits, under some circumstances, a judicially
directed sale of the fee simple but the proceeds are subject to the contingent remainder.
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tenant). It was thought at one time that the heirs of the body were to be
determined according to the common law Canons of Descent, under which,
by the rule of primogeniture, the eldest son took to the exclusion of all
other children.9 Later it was decided that the statutory scheme of descent
applicable to estates in fee simple, under which all children took equal
shares, should letermine the ownership of the remainder.100 The effect of
the Missouri Probate Code of 1955, which makes a surviving spouse a coheir with the children1± has not been decided. In its present form the
statute contributes to doubtful titles and expensive litigation.
A third objectionable feature of the Missouri statute abolishing entails
is that it may validate indestructible contingent remainders which do not
vest within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Suppose that
Andrew Baker lies in 1960 leaving a will by which he devises Missouri
land to his eldest son, Benjamin (aged 34), for life, remainder to Benjamin's
eldest son, Charles (aged 4), for life, remainder to the eldest son of Charles
and the heirs male of his body. This limitation would not violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities if the eldest son of Charles took an estate tail because
that estate would vest in him, if at all, not later than nine months after
the death of Charles, who is a life in being. The statute seems to say that
the heirs male of the body of the eldest son of Charles will take a contingent
remainder despite the Rule Against Perpetuities. Such a remainder cannot
vest until the end of a life not now in being. If the eldest son of Charles
is born in 2000 A.D., posthumously to his grandfather, Benjamin, and his
father, Charles, and dies in 2080 A.D., the contingent remainder will remain
unvested, leaving the fee simple in abeyance, for two lives in being plus
80 years or a total of 120 years. Regardless of what the legislators of 1816
thought desirable, does the present generation of Missouri lawyers think
it wise to license 120-year perpetuities which discourage or prevent the
improvement and optimum use of the land which they fetter?
The Missouri statute abolishing entails should be repealed and replaced by legislation which is better related to the public need. One possible solution would be a statute providing that a conveyance or devise
which would have created an estate tail under De Donis shall create an
estate in fee simple. Such legislation could provide that any remainder
99. Frame v. Humphreys, 164 Mo. 336, 64 S.W. 116 (1901).
100. Gillilan v. Gillilan, 278 Mo. 99, 212 S.W. 348 (1919) (en banc). Professor
Hudson's article, supra note 82, discusses this problem.
101. § 474.010, RSMo 1957 Supp.
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limited on an estate tail shall take effect as a shifting executory interest
on the death of the grantee without surviving issue.10 2 Another possible

solution would be to reenact the statute De Donis Condtionalbus, thus
restoring estates tail, with provisions abolishing primogeniture and the
preference for males in determining the heirs in tail and empowering the
tenant in tail to convey a fee simple by ordinary deed. This would permit
the creation of a destructible family perpetuity under which, so long as it
was not destroyed, the surviving spouses in each successive generation
would have no marital or inheritance rights in the land.'

102. 'For the way in which this type of legislation operates, see Fratcher, Fees
Tail in Michigan, 4 U. DEr. L. J. 19 (1940).
103. For the undesirable tendency of the marital rights provisions of the Missouri Probate Code to take property out of the family, see 24 Mo. L. REv. 498501 (1959).
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